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Abstract  
This study investigates the effect of both institutional factors and the macro economy on 
the  financial  performance  of  MFIs.  Drawing  upon  the  Microfinance  Information 
Exchange data and cross-country data on macro economy, finance and institutions, we 
use three stage least squares and Hausman-Taylor to take account of endogeneity. We 
find  that  institutional  factors  affect  MFIs’  financial  performance,  in  particular, 
profitability, operating expense, and portfolio quality. Also, GDP and share of domestic 
credit to GDP have positive impacts on MFIs’ financial performance. Hence policies to 
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Financial Performance of Microfinance Institutions-A Macroeconomic and 
Institutional Perspective 
 
1.  Introduction 
      The  financial  crisis  that  started  as  early  as  September  2007,  with  the  global  money 
markets threatening to bring down Northern Rock-the fifth largest mortgage lender in Britain- 
has put the strength of the financial markets across the world to a serious test. Sophisticated 
financial  instruments  and  lack  of  regulation  have  undermined  the  stability  of  not  just 
corporations but entire nations. The meltdown that came to the surface nearly four years ago 
has still not run its course- evidenced by the recent debt default crises in major European 
economies such as Greece, Spain, Portugal, Italy and Ireland. In a world with a high degree 
of  financial  integration,  the  events  of  September  2008,  when  Lehman  Brothers  filed  for 
bankruptcy and Merrill Lynch was sold to Bank of America, did not only change the shape of 
American finance but that of the world economy at large.  
     While academics continue to grapple with the finance-macro economy nexus, some policy 
makers and practitioners would argue that institutional factors and government regulation 
play  a  bigger  and  more  proactive  role  than  the  fundamentals  of  macro  economy  in 
determining the operations and performances of the financial market as well as financial 
institutions. Also, the relationship between the financial operations and the macro economy 
will depend on characteristics of financial sub-sectors (bank-like, stock and microfinance) 
under consideration. This paper focuses on the effects of institutional factors as well as the 
fundamentals of macro-economy on the microfinance sector in view of the recent evidence 
on the role of microfinance in reducing poverty at both the household and national level (Imai 
et al. 2010a, 2010b). Unlike the studies by Cull et al. (2007) and Hermes and Lensink (2007) 
which measured performance of microfinance institutions (MFIs) in terms of their ‘general’  
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objectives covering social (e.g. poverty reduction and gender equality) as well as financial 
ones, this paper follows the path of Gonzalez (2007) and Ahlin et al. (2011) to examine 
different dimensions of financial performance disaggregated and narrowly defined. The latter 
approach is justified as it will provide a yardstick by which we estimate the potential of 
integrating the microfinance sector into the economy-wide financial sector. In this paper, we 
examine financial performance using five specific indicators namely, return on assets, debt-
to-equity, operating expense, portfolio at risk and write-off ratios.  
     Our  paper  is  motivated  by  Gonzalez  (2007)  and  Ahlin  et  al.  (2011)  who  empirically 
showed that macroeconomic or macro institutional factors (e.g. growth of GNI per capita or 
political stability and voice and accountability) yield slower growth and higher default rates 
among MFIs. These findings suggest that in an era of global economic turmoil, microfinance 
lacks the capability to turn around the downturn. In view of the ripple effects of the crisis, it 
is particularly imperative to investigate the effects of macroeconomic and institutional factors 
on the financial performance of MFIs. The empirical literature on the relationship between 
financial  performance  of  MFIs  and  the  macro-economy  can  be  viewed  from  a  bi-causal 
perspective, that is, the financial performance of MFIs influences the macro economy (Krauss 
and Walter 2009; Imai et al 2010b) and/or the latter affects the former (Ahlin and Lin 2006, 
Ahlin  et  al.  2011,  Thapa  2008).  This  potential  bi-causal  relationship  requires  a  careful 
treatment of endogeneity.  
     Further to the potential bi-causal relationship, the literature on the link between MFIs’ 
financial performances and the macro economy provides evidence of both pro-cyclical (e.g. 
in Bolivia, Marconi and Mosley, 2006) and counter-cyclical (e.g. in Indonesia, Patten et al., 
2001)  effects.  The  counter-cyclical  effect  suggests  that  investment  through  microfinance 
cancels out the other countervailing factors that bear on investment (Marconi and Mosley,  
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2006). This is consistent with Galema et al. (2011) who used mean-variance spanning tests 
and showed that investment in microfinance has a diversification effect on the portfolio of 
investors. Krauss and Walter (2009) also examined microfinance as a means of reducing 
portfolio volatility, regressing key fundamental parameters and ratios of the leading MFIs 
against the S&P 500, MSCI Global and MSCI Emerging Markets indices (as proxies for 
global market risk) as well as against domestic GDP (as a proxy for domestic market risk). 
They consider the relative market risk, comparing MFIs to other potential emerging market 
investments – equities of listed emerging market institutions (EMIs) and equities of listed 
emerging  market  commercial  banks  (EMCBs).  Their  results  show  highly  significant 
differences between MFIs and EMIs / EMCBs regarding asset sensitivity against all three 
global performance measures. A 10% drop in the S&P 500, for example, is expected to lead 
to no impact on MFIs in terms of the asset measure, whereas EMIs and EMCBs are expected 
to lose approximately 4%-5% of their asset value. Furthermore, both profitability and loan 
portfolio quality of MFIs seem to be less sensitive to global market movements than in the 
case of EMCBs.  
     However, the findings from the Microfinance Banana Skins Survey conducted by CFI and 
CGAP in April 2009 reveal quite a diverging picture from the field. The economic crisis has 
completely  transformed  perceptions  of  the  microfinance  risk  landscape:  risks  that  were 
thought minor in a similar survey in 2008 have propelled to the top of the rankings, edging 
out risks that were previously seen as crucial to the prospects of microfinance. The biggest 
risers  in  this  survey  compared  to  the  previous  one,  highlight  the  worsening  business 
environment and threats to funding and liquidity. Many respondents fear a vicious cycle here: 
the recession creating a worse business environment leading to mounting delinquencies and  
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shrinking markets, leading to declining profitability, loss of investor confidence, and then to 
cutbacks in funding and so on. 
     Ahlin et al. (2011) examine the determinants of performances of MFIs where variables, 
such  as  self-sufficiency,  borrower  growth,  or  loan-size  growth,  are  estimated  by 
macroeconomic variables as well as macro-institutional factors, such as corruption control. 
Their  paper  relies  on  the  Microfinance  Information  Exchange  (MIX)  data  for  the  MFI 
specific  variables.  One  of  their  main  conclusions  include  that  MFIs’  performance  is  not 
necessarily good or sometimes worse in the country where institutions are more advanced. 
However, one of the limitations in Ahlin et al. (2011) is that they do not take account of 
endogeneity of key explanatory variables, including macro-institutional factors. To overcome 
the limitations in Ahlin et al. (2011), the present study uses three stage least squares (3SLS) 
and  Hausman-Taylor  (HT)  panel  estimation  to  take  account  of  the  endogeneity  of  key 
explanatory variables, including institutional factors. We find that income, share of domestic 
credit to GDP and institutional factors, namely, control of corruption, the rule of law, voice 
and accountability and political stability improve MFIs’ financial performance. In three of the 
four perspectives (profitability, asset/liability management, efficiency and portfolio quality) 
of MFIs financial performance, most of the institutional factors show a positive impact (either 
maximizing or minimizing) on the financial performance indicator in question. 
     The  rest  of  the  paper  is  structured  as  follows.  The  next  section  further  explores  why 
macro-institutional qualities would affect performances of MFIs to motivate our empirical 
analysis. Section 3 discusses the data and the variables to be used for the present study.  
Sections 4 and 5 provide econometric specifications and the main results. Conclusions from a 




2.   How can macro institutions affect financial performances of MFIs?  
    To  motivate  our  econometric  analyses  in  the  later  sections,  this  section  provides  brief 
explanations of how macro-level institutional qualities would affect financial performances of 
MFIs  drawing  upon  the  literature  on  the  link  between  institutions  and  development  of 
financial and banking sectors. To our knowledge, there have been no theoretical works to 
date to underpin the effect of macro economic or institutional context on the performance of 
MFIs.
1 Empirical evidence is also scarce, mixed and sometimes counter-intuitive (Ahlin et al. 
2011, Assefa et al., 2010 and Cuevas, 1996) both across countries and within a country. 
However,  there  is  a  large  literature  to  link  the  macro-institutions  (e.g.  corruption,  legal 
system,  social  and  political  institutions)  and  the  banking  sector  or  general  financial 
development  (e.g.  Weill,  2011;  Huang,  2010).  Weill  (2011)  empirically  showed  that 
corruption  reduces  bank  lending  at  macro  levels,  but  it  could  alleviate  firms’  financing 
obstacles  at  micro  levels.
2  Weill  argued  that  corruption  would  make  difficult  law 
enforcements  of  bank  credit  through  the  weakened  functioning  of  court  or  public 
administration. Because MFIs have to operate within the country’s regulation of the financial 
sector,  Weill’s  results  suggest  that  corruption  could  undermine  the  functioning  of  legal 
systems and reduce micro-lending or affect performances of MFIs. While there are direct 
effects of corrupted activities of MFIs on their performance at micro levels,
3 regulations of 
microfinance and of the financial sector or a broader legal framework at macro levels would 
serve as a precondition for MFI’s financial performances. Meagher et al. (2006) carried out in 
                                                           
1 Ahlin and Jiang (2008) have developed a theoretical model to examine the opposite direction of 
causality, that is, from microfinance to the macro-economy. They showed that microcredit can raise or 
lower long-run GDP as it can lower either substance or industrial technologies, while microcredit 
lowers poverty or inequality in the long run. A future study should develop a model that examines 
how macro-economic environment or institutions would affect microfinance performance.  
2 As suggested by Weill (2011), an insightful theoretical model on this is virtually non-existent.  
3 For instance, IRIN (2009) reported that local NGOs subcontracted by an international investor take 
bribes from borrowers in Benin.   
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depth comparative study of microfinance regulation of seven countries
4 and concluded that 
the extent to which the government ensures the legal and regulatory framework sufficiently 
adapted to existing microfinance models and methods is key to better performance of MFIs in 
the country. In Bolivia and Brazil where microfinance sector grew rapidly, the existing legal 
framework  served  as  the  basis  for  elaborating  the  regulations  for  MFIs,  while  Mexico 
pursued its microfinance reform through legislative action (Meagher et al., 2006). However, 
Marconi and Mosley (2006) showed in the context of Bolivia during the crisis in 1998–2004 
that government policies were counterproductive for the development of microfinance sector.  
Llanto et al. (1997) concluded that in the Philippine it was necessary for the government to 
bring  microfinance  under  a  supervisory  and  regulatory  framework  for  building  the 
institutional  capacity  of  MFIs,  which  would  affect  their  financial  performance.  However, 
Cuevas (1996) say that regulating all MFIs is not necessarily the right option. For this reason, 
we  surmise  that  it  is  the  MFI’s,  nature  of  evolution  orientation  and  desired  growth  path 
(graduation, downscaling, formalization and so on) of the MFI that should inform the role of 
enabling institutions.  
     On  the  other  hand,  Huang  (2011)  showed  that  democratic  process  is  important  for 
institutional  improvement  on  financial  development,  particularly  among  low  income 
countries  as,  for  example,  democracy  promotes  property  rights  protection  and  contract 
enforcement and discourages corruption. As microfinance involves a contractual process and, 
in particular, group lending is only effective where women are willing to form a group to 
initiate a project, the link between general and financial performance of MFIs and democracy 
or political stability cannot be ignored. Thus, Huang’s (2011) argument is likely to apply to 
the microfinance sector.   
                                                           
4 These are Bolivia, Brazil, Ghana, Indonesia, Mexico, Philippines, and South Africa.   
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     It should be noted however, that causality from macro-institutions, such as a regulatory 
framework, to the financial performances of MFIs is likely to be complex as complying with 
regulation can be costly (Cull et al., 2011). Cull et al. found that profit oriented MFIs respond 
to supervision by maintaining profit rates but curtailing outreach, while MFIs with a weaker 
commercial focus instead tend to reduce profitability.  
     Despite the complexity, it is safe to conclude that better macro-institutions (e.g. in terms 
of control of corruption, a legal and regulatory framework, social and political institutions) 
are likely to serve as distal factors that work through proximate factors, such as competition 
and board operations to enhance better institutional capacities and financial performances of 
MFIs. This prediction is tested in subsequent sections. 
      
3.  Data and Variables 
This study uses secondary data from multiple sources. These are (i) the MIX market; (ii) the 
World Bank’s World Development and Governance Indicators; (iii) Chinn and Ito (2006) 
index of capital account openness as a measure of financial openness; and (iv) European 
settler’s mortality rate in the 15
th century, based on Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001, 
2002, and 2005). We use Chinn-Ito index as an instrument for the share of domestic credit to 
GDP and the European settler’s mortality rate for the institutional factors. Other instruments 
include log of the lag of agricultural value added per worker and its square and an index of 
MFIs’ gross loan portfolio, number of MFIs and number of active borrowers.    
     The  choice  of  the  respective  instruments  namely;  European  settlers’  mortality  rate, 
financial openness, agriculture value per worker and [(gross loan portfolio /number of active 
borrowers)  X  number  of  MFIs]  used  for  the  potential  endogenous  variables,  that  is, 
institutional factors, share of domestic credit to GDP, GDP and gross loan portfolio (GLP) is  
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informed  by  the  following  intuitive  argument  and  statistical  evidence  (see  Appendix  for 
results). In the case of European settlers’ mortality rate as an instrument for institutional 
factors, Acemoglu et al. (2001 and 2002) propose a theory of institutional differences among 
countries colonized by Europeans. In their seminal papers, they find strong evidence of a 
positive relationship between evolution and characteristics of existing institutions and nature 
of colonization. Financial openness is used as an instrument for the share of domestic credit 
to GDP as a higher level of financial openness (e.g. capital account openness) spurs on equity 
market development thereby enhancing financial deepening (Baltagi et al., 2009; Imai et al., 
2010c). The relationship between agricultural value and GDP per capita is supported by the 
heavy  reliance  on  agriculture  sector  by  most  developing  economies  (Imai  et  al.,  2010c). 
Lastly, we argue that GLP of MFIs will be dependent on the number of active borrowers and 
MFIs in the country. The premise is that, for countries to attract funds for on-lending, most 
funders will examine the general microfinance landscape in the country (in this case number 
of MFIs in the country) and the ratio of GLP to number of active borrowers. This informs 
funders on the prospects of their investment. 
      The explanatory variables have been divided into three blocks, macro, institutional and 
time-related determinants of MFIs’ financial performance. These are log of GDP per capita, 
share of domestic credit provided by banking sector to GDP, institutional factors (political 
stability, rule of law, voice and accountability, control of corruption and their average), log of 
MFIs’  gross  loan  portfolio,  and  year  dummies.  The  choice  of  dependent  variables  is 
consistent with four broad perspectives of assessing financial performance of MFIs which the 
Annual  Micro  Banking  Bulletin  published  by  the  MIX  market  focuses  on,  namely  (i) 
Profitability, (ii) Asset Management, (iii) Loan Portfolio quality, and (iv) Efficiency. Amidst 
several  indicators  available  for  each  component,  we  select  a  ratio  that  will  enable  us  to  
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compare  our  results  with  previous  studies  specifically,  Gonzalez  (2007)  and  Ahlin  et  al. 
(2011).  Also,  our  selection  is  based  on  the  ratio  with  the  highest  observations  for  each 
component  with  the  exception  of  ‘(iii)  Loan  Portfolio  Quality’  where  two  ratios,  that  is, 
‘portfolio at risk’ and ‘write-off ratio’ are used.
5 ‘Return on Assets’, ‘debt-to-equity ratio’ 
and ‘operating expense ratio’ are, respectively, used to capture (i) Profitability, (ii) Asset 
Management (or leverage) and (iv) Efficiency of MFIs.  
     MFIs’ base data accessed from the MIX market website for the analysis spans from 2005 
to 2009 on 5,740 MFIs (pooled) in 106 countries. The data points, however, reduce to about 
3,126 MFIs, in 97 countries for the period 2005 to 2008 and country level variables are 
matched onto the MFI datasets. This again varies given the different data requirements of our 
two econometric specifications discussed below as well as the type of dependent variable 
under consideration. 
 
Microfinance Financial Performance Variables  
     A myriad of financial ratios are available for assessing the performance of MFIs (CGAP 
2003, the SEEP Network and Alternative Credit Technologies 2005). Although it is difficult 
to  synchronise  the  different  interpretations  of  all  the  ratios,  they  provide  alternative 
perspectives in assessing the performance of MFIs for each of the four domains, namely, 
profitability,  efficiency,  leverage  and  risk.  In  essence,  in  interpreting  the  determinants  of 
MFIs’ financial performance, due cognisance should be taken of the precise focus of each 
ratio. Based on the forgoing, this sub-section provides an interpretation of the five dependent 
                                                           
5 This is because, although portfolio at risk (30-days) is mostly reported, it is merely an accounting 
provision and could include a part of the portfolio which was eventually recovered. Write- off  ratio, 
on the other hand, is actual default.  
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variables used in this study. As mentioned earlier, the selection of these indicators was based 
on their wide usage and frequency of data points available from the MIX market. 
     Return on assets (ROA) falls within the domain of profitability measures and tracks MFIs’ 
ability to generate income based on its assets. The ratio excludes non-operating income and 
donations. ROA provides a broader perspective compared to other measures as it transcends 
the core activity of MFIs, namely, providing loans, and tracks income from all operating 
activities including investment, and also assesses profitability regardless of the MFIs’ funding 
structure. ROA is expected to be positive as a reflection of the profit margin of the MFI, 
otherwise it reflects non-profit or losses.  
     Efficiency of MFIs is measured by the share of operating expense to gross loan portfolio 
in  most  cases.  The  ratio  provides  a  broad  measure  of  efficiency  as  it  assesses  both 
administrative and personnel expense with lower values indicating more efficient operations.  
     The  debt  to  equity  ratio  is  a  member  of  the  asset/liability  management  ratios  and 
specifically  attempts  to  track  MFIs’  leverage.  This  measure  provides  information  on  the 
capital adequacy of MFIs and assesses their susceptibility to crisis. Microfinance investors 
mainly rely on this ratio as it helps to predict the probability of an MFI honouring its debt 
obligations. However, its use should always be contextualized as higher values could lead to 
growth of MFIs. 
     As mentioned earlier, two ratios are used for MFIs’ risk, namely, portfolio- at- risk (PAR) 
and write-off ratios. Higher values for both ratios which indicate low portfolio quality are not 
desirable since they can lead to lower profits and likelihood of non-sustainability of both the 
MFI and clients. The PAR values represent client loans that are outstanding and write-off 
indicates the declaration of default (strike-out from book of accounts). It is worth noting that 
portfolio  quality  of  MFIs  is  driven  by  internal  institutional  accounting  practices/norms,  
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degree of regulation (in the case of formal MFIs) and maturity of the microfinance market 
where the MFI operates.  
 
4.  Econometric Specifications  
The present study applies two econometric models, 3SLS and HT to the unbalanced panel 
data. We attempt to use 3SLS for the pooled cross- section data with year dummies to address 
the endogeneity of key explanatory variables explicitly. That is, endogenous variables are 
instrumented by external factors.
6 To supplement this, we have also applied HT model to take 
advantage of the panel data. In estimating HT model, we treat one time invariant variable 
(regulation), slow changing variables (institutional factors) and log of GLP as endogenous. In 
spite of the limitations, the use of unbalanced panel data for the entire sample will increase 
the number of observations. Across the two econometric models the sample size varies as our 
instruments used in the 3SLS cover only a subset of the entire sample.  
 
Three Stage Least Squares (3SLS)  
We use 3SLS primarily because some of our key explanatory variables (institutional factors, 
log of GDP per capita, log of gross loan portfolio and share of domestic credit provided by 
banking sector) are likely to be endogenous. MFI fixed effects are not incorporated in case of 
3SLS. This is one of the reasons for estimating the HT model as it takes into account the MFI 
fixed effects.  
     Following Imai et al. (2010c), the instruments used for institutional factors and share of 
domestic credit provided by banking sector are European settler’s mortality rate and financial 
                                                           
6 We have tried 3SLS where all MFI dummies are included as explanatory variables, which is 
equivalent to fixed-effects 3SLS. However, because of the huge sample size, the procedure did not  
converge and thus we report the case only with year dummies.    
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openness, respectively. The first stage regression results in Appendix 1 show a statistical 
significant relationship between the instruments and the potentially endogenous variables. To 
further examine the validity of our instruments, we present identification tests (under, weak 
and over) based on two-stage least squares estimations in Appendix 2. For the sake of brevity 
the results of the two-stage results are not presented but can be made available on request.  
       Econometric specifications use one symbol (FINp) to represent each of the five different 
dimensions of MFI Financial Performance. Equation (1) below represents the structure of the 
model where the effect of macro level factors, characteristics of MFIs, Institutional variables, 
and year dummies are estimated on the financial performance of MFIs. 
       i t it it it it p D I C M FIN 1 14 3 1 2 1 11 0 1 e b b b b b + + + + + =                                           (1) 
where  0 1 b  is  a  constant  term; 
it p FIN  represents  each  of  the  five  financial  performance 
indicators for ith MFI in time period t;  it M  is the vector of macro level factors, namely, log 
of  GDP  per  capita  and  share  of  domestic  credit  to  GDP;  it C represent  a  vector  of  MFI 
characteristics,  namely,  size,  age  of  MFI  and  its  square  to  capture  non-linearity, 
characterisation in terms of legal status, that is, Banks (our reference category), Credit Union 
and  Cooperatives,  Non-bank  Financial  Institutions,  Non-governmental  Financial 
Organisations  and  other  categories  and  regulation;  it I represents  institutional  factors- 
specifically, political  stability, voice and accountability, control of corruption, the rule of 
law, as well as the average of these four indicators;  t D stands for year dummies with 2005 as 
a reference point and  i 1 e  is an i.i.d. error term.  
     As mentioned earlier, in view of potential endogeneity either from the perspective of bi-
causality or measurement error, we estimate a set of four reduced form equations and plug the 
predicted values in the structural model (Equation (1)).    
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i t it it it pc D LlAg LlAg LGDP 2 3 2 2 2 1 2 0 2 2 ^ e b b b b + + + + =               (2) 
Equation (2) estimates log of the lag of agricultural value added per worker ( it LlAg ) and its 
square  ( it LlAg 2 ^ )  to  resolve  potential  endogeneity  of  the  log  of  GDP  per  capita 
(
it pc LGDP ).  t D  controls for yearly variation, 0 2 b  is a constant term and  i 2 e is an i.i.d. error 
term.  
     In  addition  to  log  of  GDPpc,  our  second  macro  level  variable  is  also  likely  to  be 
endogenous and we resolve this by estimating Equation (3) below. 
i t it it D O F 3 32 31 0 3 e b b b + + + =                                                         (3) 
where  it F  is share of domestic credit to GDP and  it O  represent financial openness (or the 
Chinn-Ito index of capital account openness). All symbols have the same interpretation as 
above with  30 b  being the constant term. 
     Also,  the  possible  endogeneity  of  institutional  factors  is  instrumented  by  the  log  of 
European settlers’ mortality rate, represented by i E in Equation (4) below. 
i t i it D E I 4 2 4 1 4 0 4 e b b b + + + =                                                                             (4) 
All symbols have the same interpretation as above with  40 b  representing a constant term. 
     Lastly, size of MFI measured by log of gross loan portfolio is instrumented by loan per 
borrower at the national level multiplied by the number of MFIs in the country. 
 
i t jt it D GLPNOABMF LGLPMF 5 2 5 1 5 50 e b b b + + + =                                      (5)  
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where  it LGLPMF  represents  the  log  of  gross  loan  portfolio  of  MFI  i  in  time  t  and 
jt GLPNOABMF is  the  log  of  country  level  [gross  loan  portfolio  *  number  of  active 
borrowers]/[number of MFIs]. 
 
Hausman-Taylor Estimation  
     In addition to 3SLS estimation, we estimate a panel regression using the HT technique. 
Unlike the traditional way of resolving endogeneity in the context of panel data, the HT 
model is capable of estimating time invariant explanatory variables (which are inestimable in 
case  of  fixed-effect  instrumental  variable  estimation).  Also,  contrary  to  random  effect 
estimation, HT estimation assumes that some of the explanatory variables are correlated with 
the unobserved panel-level random effect. This peculiar feature of the HT estimation enables 
us to include time-invariant variables, such as ‘whether the MFI is regulated or not” in the 
right  hand  side.  Also,  the  HT  estimation  resolves  endogeneity  using  variables  specified 
within  the  model.  Specifically,  the  HT  model  uses  exogenous  time-variant  variables  as 
instruments for endogenous time-variant variables and exogenous time-invariant variables as 
instruments for endogenous time-invariant variables.  
      The structural form of the HT estimation is specified as follows;  
it i il il ilt ilt pilt a Z Z X X FIN m l l x x + + + + + = 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1           (6)              
where  ilt X1  or  ilt X 2 represents a vector of time varying regressors, which is distinguished by 
subscript 1 or 2 in terms of whether it is correlated with the unobservable (ai). GDP, share of 
domestic  credit  to  GDP  and  age  of  MFIs  are  treated  as  time-varying  regressors  that  are 
uncorrelated with the unobservable term. GLP and institutional factors are treated as time-
varying regressors that are correlated with the unobservable (that is, endogenous regressors). 
We  treat  GLP  and  institutional  factors  -  which  are  our  main  variables  of  interest  -  as  
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endogenous,  as  discussed  in  the  previous  section.  il Z1  or  il Z2 denotes  time-invariant 
regressors, distinguished by subscripts 1 and 2 in a similar way depending on whether it is 
correlated  with  the  unobservable  or  not.  Legal  status  of  the  MFI  is  considered  to  be 
uncorrelated with the unobservable, while regulation is assumed to be correlated with the 
unobservable. The rationale is that in the case of regulation, whether MFIs should switch 
from the informal sector to the formal sector where operations are more heavily regulated is 
largely decided by MFIs themselves in most developing countries. As usual, all the regressors 
are  assumed  to  be  uncorrelated  with  the  idiosyncratic  error  term it m .(Dr  Imai:  pl.  clarify 
whether all or some, as some are endogenous but instrumented in a specific way in the HT 
procedure). 
      
5.  Econometric Results and Discussion 
     For the sake of brevity, we present econometric results of log of MFIs’ GLP, institutional 
factors, log of GDP per capita and domestic credit. The results of the full set of variables and 
descriptive statistics are provided in the longer version of the paper and will be provided on 




Insert Table 1 here 
 
     The central argument of this paper is that institutional factors are important for achieving 
successful microfinance (financial) performance indicators. With each financial performance 
                                                           
7 For data accuracy check and comparison of our results with Ahlin et al. (2011), we run the same set of 
regressions on a  restricted sample of MFIs that have either four or five diamonds and have obtained broadly 
similar results.  
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indicator, the results based on two estimation techniques are presented. In the space of each 
of  these  estimation  techniques,  four  different  institutional  factors  plus  their  average  are 
reported. 
        The second row of Table 1 presents the results on the relationship between log of MFI’s 
GLP and ROA. The two different models resulted in different signs in coefficient estimates 
of  both  log  of  gross  loan  portfolio  and  institutional  factors.  The  signs  of  the  coefficient 
estimates for the two models largely depend on the degree of variation between internal and 
external factors that influence the financial performance indicator in question and the manner 
in which endogeneity is resolved. In essence, what matters is the source of endogeneity and 
how each model resolves it. In the case of log of MFIs’ gross loan portfolio (GLP), the HT 
model  that  uses  internal  instruments  to  resolve  bias  shows  the  right  sign  and  statistical 
significance. Unlike the 3SLS, the observed positive coefficient of MFIs’ GLP indicates that 
higher GLP of MFIs is expected to increase ROA mainly as a result of economies of scale. 
Further inspecting the validity of our instruments, we carried out underidentification tests as 
well as weak identification tests based on two-stage least squares. Here, the null hypothesis 
that the equation is underidentified (or that the equation is only weakly identified) is strongly 
rejected, which implies that excluded instruments are relevant (or the excluded instruments 
are ‘non-weakly’ correlated with the endogenous regressors) in most of the cases. All our 
variables pass the identification tests (except GLP) validating our specification.
8   
     Based on the governance model, we expect that the coefficient estimates of institutional 
factors will be positive. That is, an MFI in a country with better control of corruption (CC) 
(or voice and accountability, rule of law and political stability) is expected to operate more 
                                                           
8 This suggests that based on the specification of our model, using the external instrument (log of 
country level (GLP/NOAB)*MFI as an instrument for GLP) will not necessarily lead to the right sign. 
This partly supports the use of HT model that employs exogenous variables within the model to help 
minimize the endogeneity associated with GLP.  
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efficiently leading to a higher ROA. The results from the 3SLS show coefficient estimates 
that are consistent with our hypothesis.  
     In terms of the relationship between MFIs’ leverage and size of MFIs, log of GLP points 
to a lower leverage indicating a potential to minimize risk of over-borrowing as firm size 
increases. In five of the ten cases that examine the effect of institutional factors on MFIs 
leverage, we find a statistically significant positive relationship. As indicated earlier, MFI’s 
willingness and ability to leverage its equity through borrowing is contextual and, among 
other factors, dependent on the stage of development of the MFI. In this case, our results 
show that macro institutional factors like rule of law, voice and accountability and political 
stability are likely to lead to higher debt-to-equity ratio. 
           On efficiency, we observe that a better macro economy, measured by log of GDP per 
capita and domestic credit provided by the banking sector, is essentially one that   optimises 
use of resources. The positive relationship between the share of domestic credit provided by 
the banking sector and MFIs efficiency can be attributed to the potential competition that the 
latter brings into the financial sector. This invariably forces MFIs to operate efficiently to 
stay in the market. As in the case of ROA, varied signs are observed for the two estimators. 
The results of 3SLS show that increase in size reduces MFIs per unit cost of operation, whilst 
those of HT estimation reveal that better institutional factors leads to efficient operations of 
MFIs. The evidence that all the institutional factors improves efficiency of MFIs (or drives 
down the cost of operation) is an indication that in the event of MFI liquidity constraints (e.g. 
due  to  lack  of  funds  for  on-lending)  as  threatened  by  the  global  economic  crisis,  other 
channels could be pursued to make the operations of MFIs sustainable. 
      The fifth and last rows show the results for MFIs’ portfolio quality. With the exception of 
institutional  factors,  most  of  the  results  are  comparable  and  consistent  with  a  priori 
expectation. In particular, on the pro-cyclical relationship between the macro economy and  
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better MFIs’ performance, lower default risk is observed when macro economy performs 
better. In the case of portfolio at risk, most of the institutional factors tend to be statistically 
non-significant  unlike  write-off  ratio.  This  is  consistent  with  the  underlying  reason  for 
exploring the effect of two different measures of portfolio quality. Thus, while portfolio at 
risk  is  a  widely  used  measure  and  subsumes  write-off  ratio,  its  handling  varies  across 
different MFIs and countries. The observed negative sign indicates that better institutional 
factors reduce MFIs’ risk of default. 
 
6.  Conclusion 
With shrinking donor investments in microfinance, a serious concern among policy makers 
and practitioners is how the macroeconomic factors or the crisis or the macro-institutional 
factors impact the performance of MFIs. The present paper investigated the effects of both 
institutional factors and the macro economy on the financial performance of MFIs, drawing 
upon  the  Microfinance  Information  Exchange  (MIX)  data  as  well  as  WDI  2010,  World 
Governance  Indicators,  and  Chinn  and  Ito  (2006)  index  of  capital  account  openness.  In 
defining a dependent variable, we considered four broad categories of MFIs’ performance, 
namely, (i) Profitability (proxied by ‘Return on Assets’), (ii) Asset Management (‘debt-to-
equity ratio’), (iii) Loan Portfolio quality (‘portfolio- at- risk’ and ‘write-off ratio’), and (iv) 
Efficiency  (‘operating  expense  ratio’).  We  examined  the  effects  of  institutional  factors, 
namely, control of corruption, the rule of law, voice and accountability and political stability 
on the performance of MFIs. The present study used 3SLS and Hausman-Taylor model to 
take account of the endogeneity of key explanatory variables, including institutional factors. 
     In contrast to Ahlin et al.’s (2011) work which shows that macro-institutional factors have 
little effects on MFI’s performances, we generally find that institutional factors affect MFIs’ 
financial performance, in particular, profitability, operating expense, and portfolio quality. It  
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is  also  found  that  the  macroeconomic  and  financial  factors,  such  as  GDP  and  share  of 
domestic credit to GDP, have positive impacts on MFIs’ financial performance - specifically 
profitability, operating  expense ratio and portfolio quality.  In three of the four indicators 
(profitability, asset/liability management, efficiency and portfolio quality) of MFIs financial 
performance, most of the institutional factors have a positive impact.   
     As markets-especially financial- are increasingly globally integrated with high contagion 
risks, macro-economic policies must be better coordinated. Of particular  importance    is 
fiscal  stimulus  in  both  USA  and  Eurozone  countries.  Politics  continues  to  hamper 
expansionary policies and consequently a quick recovery. Groups such as G-20 have failed to 
resolve the deadlock. So it is difficult to be optimistic.  
     A related issue in an environment of global crisis is whether there is a pro-cyclical or 
counter-cyclical interaction between microfinance performance and the macro- economy. Our 
results  point  to  proc-cylical  interactions  and  a  serious  risk  of  deterioration  in  MFIs’ 
performance.  If however, there is a counter-cyclical interaction, as suggested by Galema et al. 
(2011), the country may be able to attract investors’ funds in microfinance despite the global 
crisis and use them for helping the poor who are likely to be hit by the crisis. 
     Improving macro-institutional quality could also contribute substantially to making the 
activities of MFIs more sustainable under the continuing feeble and faltering recovery of the 
global economy. Institutions, however, evolve slowly and what adds to the challenge is the 
difficulty of identifying “triggers” that will accelerate their reform. However, governments 
could improve narrowly defined institutions, such as a regulatory and legal framework for 
MFIs  in  order  to  ensure  that  such  a  framework  is  sufficiently  adapted  to  the  existing 
microfinance models of the country. 
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Table 1: Effect of Institutional Factors on MFI Financial Performance: 
 
Three Stage Least Squares and Hausman-Taylor Panel Estimation- Dependent Variable: MFIs’ Financial Performance Indicators 
Dependent 
Variables  Explanatory Variables 
Control of Corruption  Rule of Law  Voice and Accountability  Political Stability  Average Governance 
3SLS  HT  3SLS  HT  3SLS  HT  3SLS  HT  3SLS  HT 
Return on 
Assets 
Log of MFIs’ Gross Loan Portfolio  -0.40  0.04  -0.28  0.04  -0.56  0.04  -0.42  0.04  -0.33  0.04 
[-6.91]**  [10.08]**  [-4.54]**  [10.00]**  [-8.10]**  [10.13]**  [-2.87]**  [10.15]**  [-5.10]**  [10.10]** 
Institutional Factors  0.23  -0.01  0.11  -0.03  0.19  0.00  0.23  -0.02  0.26  -0.04 
[3.78]**  [-0.75]  [3.19]**  [-1.90]+  [3.79]**  [0.09]  [3.29]**  [-2.37]*  [4.77]**  [-2.14]* 
Log of GDP Per Capita 
 
1.84  -0.14  1.25  -0.12  2.47  -0.16  1.88  -0.18  1.50  -0.13 
[7.38]**  [-1.03]  [4.78]**  [-0.86]  [8.13]**  [-1.21]  [3.07]**  [-1.39]  [5.54]**  [-0.96] 
Domestic Credit 
 
0.01  -0.00  0.01  -0.00  0.01  -0.00  0.01  -0.00  0.01  -0.00 
[11.77]**  [-1.47]  [7.35]**  [-0.52]  [11.21]**  [-1.58]  [10.13]**  [-1.33]  [10.70]**  [-1.06] 
Debt to 
Equity Ratio 
Log of MFIs’ Gross Loan Portfolio 
 
-420.60  -32.70  -343.53  -33.58  -131.81  -32.55  -216.45  -33.59  -481.95  -33.20 
[-4.48]**  [-2.60]**  [-3.25]**  [-2.67]**  [-1.52]  [-2.53]*  [-0.95]  [-2.73]**  [-4.25]**  [-2.59]** 
Institutional Factors 
 
150.99  4.21  109.48  101.86  105.44  60.11  -7.42  94.08  170.86  173.77 
[1.56]  [0.07]  [1.91]+  [1.54]  [1.76]+  [0.91]  [-0.07]  [2.65]**  [1.83]+  [2.18]* 
Log of GDP Per Capita 
 
1880.23  364.68  1536.51  125.62  610.79  334.83  959.29  237.31  2142.46  113.14 
[4.80]**  [0.76]  [3.45]**  [0.25]  [1.62]  [0.72]  [1.01]  [0.48]  [4.54]**  [0.23] 
Domestic Credit 
 
7.36  0.24  6.36  -0.36  3.64  0.24  4.46  0.11  9.03  -0.13 




Log of MFIs’ Gross Loan Portfolio 
 
1.95  -0.17  1.33  -0.17  1.93  -0.17  1.47  -0.17  1.60  -0.17 
[7.65]**  [-17.99]**  [4.71]**  [-17.82]**  [7.64]**  [-17.44]**  [2.84]**  [-17.88]**  [5.46]**  [-17.98]** 
Institutional Factors 
 
-1.28  0.00  -0.67  0.05  -0.85  -0.09  -0.44  0.03  -1.27  0.02 
[-4.86]**  [0.01]  [-4.37]**  [1.12]  [-4.78]**  [-2.13]*  [-1.81]+  [1.47]  [-5.20]**  [0.46] 
Log of GDP Per Capita 
 
-8.87  0.22  -5.94  0.14  -8.44  0.29  -6.44  0.26  -7.23  0.20 
[-8.13]**  [0.55]  [-4.92]**  [0.36]  [-7.64]**  [0.72]  [-2.97]**  [0.67]  [-5.85]**  [0.51] 
Domestic Credit 
 
-0.04  0.00  -0.03  0.00  -0.04  0.00  -0.04  0.00  -0.04  0.00 
[-12.73]**  [1.39]  [-7.38]**  [0.99]  [-11.27]**  [1.40]  [-9.34]**  [1.32]  [-11.29]**  [1.32] 
Portfolio at 
Risk 
Log of MFIs’ Gross Loan Portfolio 
 
0.30  -0.02  0.30  -0.02  0.10  -0.02  0.05  -0.01  0.36  -0.02 
[9.25]**  [-5.93]**  [7.20]**  [-5.96]**  [4.98]**  [-6.13]**  [1.53]  [-5.79]**  [8.17]**  [-5.81]** 
Institutional Factors 
 
0.01  -0.04  0.01  0.03  -0.04  -0.02  0.02  0.01  0.00  -0.01 
[0.31]  [-3.45]**  [0.42]  [1.94]+  [-2.80]**  [-1.88]+  [1.30]  [1.25]  [0.04]  [-0.55] 
Log of GDP Per Capita 
 
-1.17  0.18  -1.15  0.08  -0.39  0.16  -0.18  0.11  -1.41  0.10 
[-9.45]**  [1.64]  [-7.21]**  [0.73]  [-4.77]**  [1.38]  [-1.40]  [1.02]  [-8.34]**  [0.95] 
Domestic Credit 
 
-0.01  0.00  -0.01  -0.00  -0.00  0.00  -0.00  0.00  -0.01  0.00 





Log of MFIs’ Gross Loan Portfolio 
 
0.12  -0.01  0.08  -0.01  0.11  -0.01  0.08  -0.01  0.09  -0.01 
[6.66]**  [-6.42]**  [4.25]**  [-6.30]**  [6.68]**  [-6.48]**  [3.28]**  [-6.42]**  [4.76]**  [-6.43]** 
Institutional Factors 
 
-0.06  0.00  -0.03  -0.02  -0.04  -0.01  -0.00  -0.00  -0.05  -0.02 
[-4.06]**  [0.14]  [-3.09]**  [-2.98]**  [-4.03]**  [-1.39]  [-0.16]  [-0.92]  [-4.00]**  [-1.81]+ 
Log of GDP Per Capita 
 
-0.49  0.01  -0.33  0.05  -0.45  0.01  -0.31  0.01  -0.38  0.03 
[-6.92]**  [0.20]  [-4.27]**  [0.86]  [-6.56]**  [0.13]  [-3.28]**  [0.17]  [-4.94]**  [0.40] 
Domestic Credit 
 
-0.00  0.00  -0.00  0.00  -0.00  0.00  -0.00  0.00  -0.00  0.00 
[-10.46]**  [0.44]  [-6.40]**  [1.58]  [-9.80]**  [0.55]  [-6.77]**  [0.49]  [-8.61]**  [0.76] 
















Appendix 1:  First Stage Regression for 3-Stage Least Squares 




Rule of Law  Voice and 
Accountability 
Political Stability  Average 
Governance 
Return on Assets 
Log of GDP per capita 
Log of lag of Agric. Value per worker  1.28[110.91]**  1.22[102.83]**  1.26[108.44]**  1.25[103.59]**  1.27[108.18]** 
Log of lag of Agric. Value per worker Squared  -0.03[-23.66]**  -0.03[-17.35]**  -0.03[-22.04]**  -0.03[-20.16]**  -0.03[-21.89]** 
Share of Domestic Credit  Financial Openness  -0.76[-1.66]+  0.84[1.88]+  -0.79[-1.71]+  -0.57[-1.24]  -0.62[-1.35] 
Log of GLP  Log of country level (GLP/NOAB)*MFI  1.45[119.52]**  1.47[121.26]**  1.46[120.53]**  1.45[119.42]**  1.45[119.35]** 
Institutional Factors  Log of European Settlers Mortality  -0.11[-29.26]**  -0.12[-29.58]**  -0.03[-5.44]**  -0.11[-18.42]**  -0.09[-24.95]** 
Debt-to-Equity Ratio 
Log of GDP per capita 
Log of lag of Agric. Value per worker  1.27[118.66]**  1.21[110.29]**  1.25[115.92]**  1.24[111.14]**  1.25[116.01]** 
Log of lag of Agric. Value per worker Squared  -0.03[-24.60]**  -0.03[-17.88]**  -0.03[-22.95]**  -0.03[-20.88]**  -0.03[-22.74]** 
Share of Domestic Credit  Financial Openness  -0.57[-1.32]  1.21[2.85]**  -0.60[-1.38]  -0.62[-1.41]  -0.37[-0.85] 
Log of GLP  Log of country level (GLP/NOAB)*MFI  1.45[126.94]**  1.46[128.43]**  1.45[128.14]**  1.44[126.68]**  1.44[126.66]** 
Institutional Factors  Log of European Settlers Mortality  -0.11[-31.25]**  -0.12[-30.97]**  -0.03[-6.21]**  -0.10[-18.10]**  -0.09[-25.80]** 
Operating Expense Ratio 
Log of GDP per capita  Log of lag of Agric. Value per worker  1.28[111.13]**  1.22[103.07]**  1.26[108.59]**  1.25[103.78]**  1.27[108.43]** 
  Log of lag of Agric. Value per worker Squared  -0.03[-23.67]**  -0.03[-17.40]**  -0.03[-22.03]**  -0.03[-20.17]**  -0.03[-21.94]** 
Share of Domestic Credit  Financial Openness  -0.65[-1.41]  0.92[2.04]*  -0.68[-1.48]  -0.50[-1.09]  -0.50[-1.08] 
Log of GLP  Log of country level (GLP/NOAB)*MFI  1.45[119.10]**  1.47[120.84]**  1.45[120.11]**  1.45[118.94]**  1.45[118.92]** 
Institutional Factors  Log of European Settlers Mortality  -0.11[-29.33]**  -0.12[-29.64]**  -0.02[-5.31]**  -0.11[-18.45]**  -0.09[-24.99]** 
Portfolio at Risk 
Log of GDP per capita  Log of lag of Agric. Value per worker  1.27[112.11]**  1.20[103.65]**  1.25[109.70]**  1.24[104.26]**  1.25[109.00]** 
  Log of lag of Agric. Value per worker Squared  -0.03[-22.94]**  -0.02[-16.49]**  -0.03[-21.24]**  -0.03[-19.24]**  -0.03[-20.94]** 
Share of Domestic Credit  Financial Openness  -0.34[-0.75]  1.35[3.05]**  -0.29[-0.64]  -0.39[-0.86]  -0.15[-0.33] 
Log of GLP  Log of country level (GLP/NOAB)*MFI  1.43[120.82]**  1.45[122.49]**  1.44[121.92]**  1.43[120.65]**  1.43[120.61]**  
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Institutional Factors  Log of European Settlers Mortality  -0.11[-29.80]**  -0.12[-29.65]**  -0.02[-5.01]**  -0.10[-17.81]**  -0.09[-24.62]** 
Write-off Ratio 
Log of GDP per capita  Log of lag of Agric. Value per worker  1.28[108.38]**  1.22[99.94]**  1.26[105.92]**  1.25[100.35]**  1.27[105.34]** 
  Log of lag of Agric. Value per worker Squared  -0.03[-22.88]**  -0.03[-16.52]**  -0.03[-21.09]**  -0.03[-19.12]**  -0.03[-21.08]** 
Share of Domestic Credit  Financial Openness  -0.11[-0.24]  1.56[3.39]**  -0.05[-0.10]  -0.00[-0.01]  0.10[0.20] 
Log of GLP  Log of country level (GLP/NOAB)*MFI  1.44[114.32]**  1.46[116.21]**  1.44[115.24]**  1.43[114.19]**  1.43[114.17]** 
Institutional Factors  Log of European Settlers Mortality  -0.11[-28.82]**  -0.13[-29.16]**  -0.02[-5.18]**  -0.11[-18.81]**  -0.09[-24.76]** 
 
Appendix 2: Identification test of Instruments: Based on Two-Stage Least Square Estimations  
Identification 















626.18 (0.00)  152.79 (0.00)  2.20 (0.14)  22.87 (0.00)  3.22 (0.07)  2.54 (0.11)  452.54 (0.00)  112.99 (0.00) 
Weak 
Identification  
384.02 (0.00)  159.08 (0.00)  2.21 (0.14)  22.93 (0.00)  3.20 (0.07)  2.52 (0.11)  562.26 (0.00)  118.07 (0.00) 
Over 
Identification 
Exactly 
identified 
Exactly 
identified 
Exactly 
identified 
Exactly 
identified 
Exactly 
identified 
Exactly 
identified 
Exactly 
identified 
Exactly 
identified 
 